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For about the last eight years I have been deeply interested in the
often-perplexing problems of causation in the law of torts. The advent of
the "toxic tort crisis" has made resolution of these problems more urgent
than ever before. Unfortunately, many recent attempts to address them
have not paid sufficient attention to the theoretical foundations of both
tort law and causation. The papers gathered together in this symposium
are an attempt to fill this gap. All of the papers make fundamental theo-
retical contributions toward a better understanding of the critical issues.
They probe deeply into the nature of causation thus seeking to shed light
on the more practical matters that have surfaced in the tort crisis.
In this brief foreword I shall make no attempt to summarize the
papers in any detail. The authors speak well on their own behalf. Nor
shall I criticize the papers here despite my own strongly-held views on
the subject. I think it inappropriate for a host gratuitously to criticize his
guests. Criticism at this juncture would also deflect the reader's atten-
tion from the important contributions contained within this symposium.
I shall, however, spend some time outlining what I take to be the key
issues in any examination of causal questions in tort law. What follows
may be viewed as a series of short notes on causation.
I. NATURE OF CAUSATION'
Causation is notoriously difficult to define. Accordingly, I shall not
attempt such a definition here. Instead, I would like to discuss the cen-
tral feature of causal interaction: transmission of a mark. Causal inter-
action is a property of processes, and not of events, persons or things. A
causal process is capable of transmitting its own structure in the form of
a mark. This mark persists even after the causal interaction has ended.
Consider the simple example of an automobile hitting a pedestrian at a
crossing. This is an intersection of two causal processes: the moving au-
* Associate Professor of Economics, New York University. B.A. 1970, Fordham University;
M.A. 1973, Ph.D. 1977, University of Chicago.
1. This section reflects the causal theory expounded in W. SALMON, SCIENTIFIC
EXPLANATION AND THE CAUSAL STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD 168-74 (1984).
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tomobile and the street-crossing pedestrian. There is a collision, after
which the processes leave their marks. The pedestrian may have a bro-
ken leg, and the automobile may have a slight dent and blood splattered
over it. The mark, which constitutes the sign of a causal interaction, is
not any change that takes place in the relevant entities. It is a change
relative to a baseline of noninterference in the individual processes. Each
process can undergo changes of its own accord. The automobile can pass
the crossing, and the pedestrian can get to the other side of the street.
These are not the marks of a causal interaction. The mark is the modifi-
cation of the characteristic the process would have exhibited. Thus,
omissions are not causal processes. An omission simply permits a system
to go on its way, or to exhibit the natural evolution of its characteristics.
II. BACKGROUND OF RIGHTS
The descriptive aspect of causation discussed in the previous section
can be analyzed quite independently of the idea of rights. In legal discus-
sions, however, the ascertainment of rights is logically prior to the ascer-
tainment of causation. 2 This logical priority is obscured by the
"imprecision" that is characteristic of ordinary discourse. In common-
sense terms, what we denote as a cause is a fusion of two ideas: the
descriptive concept of causation, and the conclusion about responsibility
emanating from a particular rights assignment. Sometimes this produces
a deviation from what would have been assigned causal status in a purely
descriptive model, while at other times it does not. If descriptive causa-
tion is absent and the defendant has no affirmative duty of care, then, in
common-sense terms, there is no causation. On the other hand, if there is
a duty of care, there will be common-sense causation, even without de-
scriptive causation. These two types of cases raise questions about the
causal status of omissions. Consider the following examples. Suppose
Jones hears a small child, who is about to drown in a swimming pool,
yelling for help. Although Jones could save the child at little cost to
himself, he chooses not to and continues on his evening stroll. If the
child drowns, is Jones the (or a) cause? Clearly his inaction is a neces-
sary condition of the child's death, but that in turn is neither necessary
nor sufficient to establish a causal connection. Whether common sense
attributes causality to Jones' omission depends on the status of Jones'
duty (and the child's correlative right) to rescue. If Jones has no such
duty recognized in morality or in law, then he is not the (or a) cause of
2. 1 agree here with R. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Can-
straints. 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 50-53 (1979).
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the death. No one would claim, for example, that, if in a similar situa-
tion, Jones had failed to aid a small bird who was about to drown, he
would be the cause of its death. This is because no one believes that he
has a duty to rescue birds.
On the other hand, suppose an accountant negligently fails to pro-
vide the financial statement of a firm by the agreed-upon date. If the
absence of this information leads the firm to engage in imprudent behav-
ior that has a financially ruinous outcome, the accountant will be consid-
ered the (or a) cause even though, as in the previous case, there was no
physical invasion or descriptive causation of any other kind. The con-
tractual relationship between the parties created a right in the plaintiff
and correlative duty in the defendant to the agreed-upon services. The
defendant's omission will then be a common-sense cause of the plaintiff's
ruin. In descriptive terms, however, the defendant is not the source of a
causal process. He is simply being held liable for not having undertaken
a causal process that would have deflected the course of events. Liability
follows from the absence of causation-the absence of a contractually-
promised causal process.
From the preceding discussion it might seem that the existence of a
duty (or its correlative right) is necessary for common-sense causation,
while descriptive causation is neither necessary nor sufficient. This im-
pression would be mistaken. Common-sense causation can be present
even where no rights of the plaintiff have been violated. In most cases,
the common-sense view of causal interaction is completely isomorphic to
the descriptive view. The violation of a plaintiff's rights, however, is cru-
cial in the determination of legal liability. For this descriptive or com-
mon-sense causation is not enough. Two examples will make these
points clear.
Suppose a new entrant into the industry that manufactures silk gar-
ments is able to produce them more cheaply and without compromising
quality. As a result, an incumbent firm loses money and goes out of
business. Can it recover these losses on tort principles? Clearly not.
This is the case despite the presence of descriptive causation: the new
entrant "caused" their garments to be produced more efficiently which in
turn "caused" consumers (given their preferences) to stop buying the in-
cumbent firm's products. One explanation of this result is that the stabi-
lization of business profits is not a right recognized at common law. The
showing of causation is thus irrelevant to the issue of liability when no
right has been violated.
In most cases the existence of a right is determined by factors
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outside the control of the parties to a dispute. In some situations, how-
ever, this is not true. Suppose an individual has a fatal disease and agrees
to take a new, experimental drug in the hope of obtaining a cure. In-
stead, the drug unambiguously causes physical injury to him without im-
proving his chances for survival. Despite a showing of descriptive (and
common-sense) causation, he cannot recover damages if he voluntarily
assumed the risks associated with the drug. Although an individual nor-
mally has the right to be free from physical invasion, he has, in this case
and in this respect, given up that right in the hope of ensuring survival.
Once again, then, causation is irrelevant when no right has been violated.
In summary, the two crucial elements of tort liability are the exist-
ence of a right and the showing of descriptive causation or the omission
of an obligatory causal process. Occasionally the common-sense view of
causation merges the two ideas, as when people say, for example, either
that the passer-by did not cause the child's drowning, or that the ac-
countant's omission did cause the firm's ruin. Generally, however, the
ideas are separated in ordinary discourse as they should be in law.
III. POLICY VERSUS COMMON-SENSE CAUSATION
The orthodox theory of causation distinguishes between cause-in-
fact and legal or proximate cause. The former is an attempt to capture at
least some of the descriptive aspects of causation. We usually say that X
is a factual cause of Y if (i) Y actually occurred, and (ii) X is a necessary
condition for Y. There are, however, several exceptions to the second
requirement but they apply only to a minority of cases.3 Legal or proxi-
mate cause "is not logic. It is practical politics."' 4 A good deal of what is
discussed under the rubric of legal causation is really a debate over policy
goals and the best way to implement them.
Descriptive causation, on the other hand, is independent of specific
policy goals. It is rooted in the structure of both scientific and common-
sense causal understanding. A scientist does not have to possess a set of
policy goals in order to determine whether the intersection of physical
processes is causal. Similarly, in everyday life, people make causal judg-
ments without subscribing to any specific set of social or economic poli-
cies. Some common-sense causal statements are not "purely"
descriptive, as we have seen, but contain implicit moral judgments about
3. For a discussion of these cases, see, for example, H.L.A. HART & T. HONOR t, CAUSATION
IN THE LAW 122-28 (2d ed. 1985).
4. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 352, 162 N.E. 99, 103 (1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting).
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prima facie responsibility. This is because they are really complex state-
ments involving both causal claims and rights claims.
Most economic analyses of causation are manifestations of the pol-
icy approach. They postulate a specific objective-for example, the mini-
mization of the sum of expected accident and accident prevention costs-
and then derive rules for the imposition of liability consistent with this
objective. Use of the term "cause" then becomes superfluous. 5 The com-
mon-sense approach, however, may also serve an economic function. In
this case, rendering the substance of legal arguments in a way that is
consistent with (or reducible to) the structure of common-sense thought
enhances the predictability of law. It creates a framework in which peo-
ple can plan their actions without the threat of legal interventions, espe-
cially since such interventions can only be predicted, if at all, with the aid
of expensive technical knowledge.
IV. NEGLIGENCE VERSUS STRICT LIABILITY
While causal theory can be developed independently of the debate
over negligence and strict liability, there is a relationship between these
two sets of issues. Those for whom descriptive causation is little more
than the but-for test are forced to adopt negligence as a central ground of
liability. There is no other way to avoid the regressus ad infinitum gener-
ated by their view of causation. If Smith, driving his automobile, unin-
tentionally hits a pedestrian, Jones, as he crosses the street, are Smith's
parents causes of the accident? Are their parents also causes? There is
no end to the backward train of necessary conditions. The defender of
the but-for test must stop somewhere. He stops when he reaches a neces-
sary condition that is also an instance of wrongful conduct. In the ab-
sence of intention or statutory prohibition, wrongful conduct is some
variant of negligence. Since Smith's parents and grandparents were not
guilty of negligent behavior in having children, the causal chain does not
extend to them. They are thus not "proximately" linked to the accident. 6
It is doubtful, however, that the invocation of "negligence" is neces-
sary to halt the potentially infinite regress of conditions. Even without a
concept of negligent driving, common-sense causal attribution would
never fall prey to such a regress. In a common-sense framework the be-
havior of Smith's parents and grandparents seems far from the causal
5. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 109 (1983).
6. For an example of this type of reasoning, see O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 92-95
(1881).
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inquiry. True, their behavior is a necessary condition of the accident, but
it is causally irrelevant. Whether or not Smith could have avoided the
accident by more careful driving, it is still he, and not his parents or
grandparents, who injured Jones. One reason for ignoring this powerful
common-sense intuition lies in the difficulty of formalizing it. Why
should any necessary condition be causally irrelevant? The answer must
lie in analyzing the concept of "relevance." ' 7 In order to understand, for
example, why an individual has a disease known as "paresis," it is useful
to partition the class of all potential victims, that is, all human beings.
One partition consists of dividing that reference class into those with un-
treated latent syphilis and those without. No one in the latter group is
observed with paresis, but some small percentage of the former do get the
disease. So it appears that the presence of untreated latent syphilis may
help us understand why some individuals get the disease, and others do
not. Indeed, syphilis may be a necessary condition for the development
of paresis. Now let us return to the case of Jones' injury.
The causal question is: why did this particular case of driving result
in injury to a pedestrian crossing the road, while the other cases of driv-
ing did not? Presumably the analyst would find it helpful to partition the
reference class of all drivers on that road into two groups, those who hit
pedestrians and those who did not. This may begin to show the rele-
vance of Smith's driving to the injury. Although Smith's birth is a neces-
sary condition of his driving and, hence, of the accident, it does not
constitute a possible partition of the class of explanations (the "ex-
planans"). It is meaningless to divide the class of drivers into those who
have been born and those who have not. This necessary condition is
irrelevant (in contrast to syphilis in the paresis example) because it does
not even potentially shed light on the question: why did this driver injure
a pedestrian while other drivers did not?8 A causal argument is made
relative to a partition in the reference class. The crucial error in the
regression argument is that it abstracts from that partition and hence
from the very context of the question.
7. I am indebted to the analysis in W. SALMON, supra note 1, at 128-29.
8. This formulation of the question is strictly appropriate only in a deterministic context. In
that context, explaining why A injured a pedestrian is equivalent to explaining that B did not, if
indeed he did not. When a cause necessitates its effect, then the absence of that cause (assuming
uniqueness of causation) fully explains the absence of the effect. In cases of statistical explanation
the question would have to be reformulated: why do drivers in this type of situation have a higher
incidence of accidents than drivers in another type of situation?
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V. PROBABILISTIC CAUSATION
Before concluding these brief notes on causation, I would like to
turn to a topic that is receiving increasing attention by those concerned
with the current tort crisis: probabilistic causation. It is clear that the
concept of a cause as a necessary and sufficient condition of an outcome
is inadequate for understanding mass exposure or "toxic" torts. In cir-
cumstances where an individual is exposed to some hazardous chemical
and then develops cancer, the chemical exposure is usually neither neces-
sary nor sufficient. It is not necessary because there are other ways to
develop even this specific form of cancer. It is not sufficient because the
probability of getting the disease, given exposure, is typically very low.
Analysts have thus concentrated on the incremental rise in the overall
frequency of the disease in the affected population that is attributed to
the exposure.9 While this may be the proper focus of study in many
circumstances, it ought to be the conclusion of an analysis rather than
the starting point.
The essential feature of probabilistic causation is the intersection of
two or more stochastic processes. A rise in the probability (frequency) of
an outcome may be evidence of causation. It is not the causal phenome-
non itself. 10 Exposure to cigarette smoke, for example, interacts stochas-
tically with the human lung to produce certain changes at the cellular
level. These changes, in turn, have a certain propensity (much less than
unity) to generate cancer. This will appear in large populations of ciga-
rette smokers as an increased incidence of lung cancer attributable to
smoking. The increased incidence is a signal that certain causal
processes are at work. In and of itself, this does not indicate that the
causal relations are probabilistic. There may be some unidentified factor,
X, sometimes present in smokers that, together with cigarette smoking,
necessitates development of the disease.
The confusion between causation and evidence of causation gener-
ally arises whenever there are two or more distinct causal processes by
which an outcome can be generated. Under these circumstances, a cause
may actually lower the probability of its effect." Suppose, for example,
that exposure to a certain chemical has two consequences. First, it en-
9. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic Personal
Injuries, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 417 (1984); Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for
Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779 (1985).
10. Papineau, Probabilities and Causes, 82 J. PHIL. 57 (1985).
11. Discussion of this issue can be found in Hesslow, Two Notes on the Probabilistic Approach to
Causality, 43 PHIL. Sci. 290 (1976). A reply to Hesslow is contained in Rosen, In Defense of a
Probabilistic Theory of Causality, 45 PHIL. Sci. 604 (1978). There is additional discussion in W.
SALMON, supra note 1, at 199-200.
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hances the body's resistance to carcinogens found in commonly-con-
sumed foods (e.g., in bacon, peanut butter). Second, it triggers a
stochastic process that has a 0.001 propensity of producing non-food re-
lated cancerous changes at the cellular level. The first effect, we shall
assume, lowers the incidence of stomach cancer from 0.004 to 0.001 in
the affected population, while the second effect increases the incidence of
stomach cancer by 0.001. The aggregate result in the affected population
will be a decrease in the incidence of disease by one-half (0.004 to 0.002).
Does this mean that the chemical exposure cannot cause cancer? Clearly
not. Simple examination of aggregate incidence rates, however, will not
always reveal the causal mechanism at work.
There is another confusion between causation and evidence of cau-
sation that arises in the context of multiple causes. This stems from the
belief that joint causation is really an illusion.' 2 If we really understood
the phenomena we are studying, the argument goes, we would know that,
in any given instance, there is only one complex of conditions responsible
for a particular effect. Thus, joint causation is really uncertainty about
which of several possibilities actually did cause the outcome in question.
In Summers v. Tice, 13 for example, two hunters negligently fired their
guns in the direction of a third who was then injured. It was clear that
only one hunter had actually injured him, but it was impossible to deter-
mine which one. This is quite obviously a case of uncertainty about cau-
sation, yet it is often classified as a "joint torts" or joint causation case.'
4
The problem is no different in a probabilistic context. In that context, as
well, joint causation cases are treated as if they were simply cases of un-
certainty about causation.' 5 Thus, when an individual who smokes is
also exposed to air pollution, it makes sense, on this view, to claim that,
barring synergistic effects, either smoking or pollution must have caused
his cancer but not both. This, however, is incorrect. Suppose there are
two independent simultaneous stochastic processes linked with a particu-
lar outcome. Each has a probability, when acting alone, of producing
this outcome equal to 0.4. If a population is exposed to both processes
the aggregate frequency of the outcome will be 0.64, and not 0.80.16 This
12. Unger, The Uniqueness in Causation, 14 AM. PHIL. Q. 177 (1977).
13. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
14. Landes & Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
517, 541-42 (1980).
15. Consider the implicit assumption underlying the following statement: "[I1t will not be
known whether the carcinogenic substance discharged from a chemical plant or normal exposure to
medical X-radiation .. .caused an individual's lung cancer." Shavell, Uncertainty Over Causation
and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28 J.L. & ECON. 587, 587 (1985).
16. The mathematics are simple. The joint result of the two causes acting independently will be
the sum of: (1) the probability of the "first" cause being efficacious and the "second" cause having
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is because in 25% of the cases in which the outcome is manifest, both
processes caused it. 17 In other words, in these cases there is causal re-
dundancy or overdetermination. The issue is not simply one of uncer-
tainty as to whether process A or process B is the cause. Sometimes,
even from the omniscient perspective, both are.'
8
The fundamental point is that causation is a fact just like the weight
of an airplane, the density of an atmosphere, or the distance of another
solar system. The facts of probabilistic causation consist of the nature of
interaction among stochastic processes. These facts, like all other scien-
tific facts, cannot be known with absolute certainty. Probabilities thus
enter the analysis of causal connections at two levels. The first is the
level of the stochastic process itself, that is, the description of its propen-
sity to achieve particular results. Thus, the "probability" in probabilistic
causation refers to these propensities or physical tendencies in the rele-
vant processes.' 9 The second is the level of evidence. A claim about
physical propensities may be more or less certain depending on the na-
ture of the evidence available. The "probability" of such a claim is a
degree of belief, conditionalized on the scientific evidence. Only this sec-
ond sense of "probability" is necessarily subject to the requirements of
the preponderance of the evidence standard.
VI. THE SYMPOSIUM
I hope that the foregoing discussion has placed some of the major
causal issues in a broader context. In the papers and comments that fol-
low, a wide range of subjects is treated to a rather intensive analysis. The
place of negligence and strict liability in causal theory is probed by Er-
nest Weinrib. The relation between causality and rights is discussed by
Judith Thomson. Robert Cooter considers the contributions that eco-
nomic analysis has made, and can make, to the development of modem
no effect; (2) the probability of the second cause being efficacious and the first having no effect; and
(3) the probability of both causes being efficacious. If a is the probability of one cause resulting in a
particular outcome and 13 is the probability of the other cause, then the joint or accumulated
probability will be:
a(1 - 13) + 13(1 - a) + a13 =
Let a = 0.4 and 13 = 0.4, then 8 will equal 0.64.
For discussions of the above, see Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts.- An
Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1410 (1980); Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment.
Reply to the Critics, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 219, 221-22 (1986).
17. This is equal to a13/ or 0.16/0.64.
18. In each of the remaining 75% of the cases, however, either one or the other caused the
outcome but not both.
19. The classic statement of the propensity interpretation of probability is from Popper, The
Propensity Interpretation of Probability, 10 BRIT. J. FOR PHIL. Scl. 25 (1959). A more recent influen-
tial study is D. MELLOR, THE MATTER OF CHANCE (1971).
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causal doctrines. Mark Kelman offers a fundamental critique of both
traditional causal doctrines and recent probabilistic analysis. Finally,
Richard Epstein develops the rights context of causation in his
Afterword.
